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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the relation between firm performance preceding the Financial Crisis 
and their CEO compensation after the Crisis. We find a significant decrease in CEO 
compensation for firms that had bad performance prior to the Crisis, compared to those who 
performed well before the Crisis. This result remains after controlling for firm size, accounting 
performance, and year and industry fixed effects. The decrease in compensation seems to be 
derived from the drop in equity-based compensation. We conclude that boards are effective and 
considered the performance of the firm prior to the Crisis when they considered setting the 
compensation following the shock of the Crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, many scholars have paid attention to the relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance, and most of them find that firm performance affects 
executive compensation (e.g., Mehran (1995), Toshiaki, Joseph and Lee-Seok (2008), Tung 
and Wang (2011), Renée (2012)). 
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the following questions: Did the 
Financial Crisis have a sizeable effect on CEO compensation decisions? If it did, was there a 
difference in compensation between firms that had bad performance before the Crisis compared 
with those who had good performance prior to the Crisis? We use a difference in differences 
method to control for the economic shock of the crises (following Lehman Brothers collapse), 
which should have led many companies to reconsider their compensation strategy. Hence, the 
premise of our analysis is that the Financial Crisis should affect all firms’ CEO compensation 
during our analysis period; but it should probably have a stronger effect on bad performing 
companies. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that if governance levels are on 
average similar across both good and bad performing firms (prior to the crises), logic would 
suggest that the exogenous shock of the Crisis would lead to a more sizeable reduction in 
compensation for the bad performing firms if and only if, compensation is set based on 
performance.  
We find that firms that did not performed well prior to the Crisis (based on their holding period 
return in the years 2006-2008) decreased their CEO compensation in the period after the Crisis, 
compared with good performing firms. On average, bad performing firms decreased their CEOs’ 
total compensation by nearly $1.19 million US dollars, suggesting a 27.0% drop in the 
compensation. Good performing firms decreased their total compensation by $0.74 million US 
dollars in 2008 and 2009, suggesting a 14% drop in the compensation. Based on our regression 
results, the difference between good and bad performing firms is significant at the 10% level. 
We also find that the reduction of CEOs’ total compensation comes mostly from the drop in 
equity-based compensation in firms that performed bad before the Crisis. Firm performance 
before the Crisis has little effect on the salary and the bonus compensation after the Crisis.  
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The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes various views of existing empirical 
literature. Section 3 outlines the data, variables, t-test and hypothesis. Section 4 presents and 
explains the empirical results. Section 5 is the conclusions about the key findings. 
2. Literature review 
 
Many prior papers have attempted to examine the relation between executive compensation 
and firm performance, with various findings. The findings can be partitioned into three 
categories: (1) executive compensation is positively associated with firm performance; (2) 
executive compensation is negatively associated with firm performance; (3) there is no relation 
between executive compensation and firm performance. 
A number of researchers got to the conclusion that there is a positive relation between pay 
and performance. For example, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) use the abnormal stock return as 
the measure of firm stock price performance and find a significant positive relation between 
stock performance and salary plus bonus. Instead of using stock price performance, Takao and 
Katsuyuki (2006) focus on ROA (a standard accounting measure of firm profitability) and find a 
positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and ROA, which supports their 
hypothesis that Japanese CEO’s cash compensation (salary and bonus) is sensitive to firm 
performance. Toshiaki, Joseph and Lee-Seok (2008) extend the former researches by using 
several short-term and long-term firm performance measures. They provide evidence that 
changes in CEO compensation are significantly positively related to firm performance both in 
Japan and US, but they don’t find relation between changes in CEO compensation and the 
sales growth. In contrast, Takao and Chery (2006) find that sales growth is significantly related 
to executive compensation in China. Based on the positive relationship, Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) argue that it’s the structure rather than the level of manager’s compensation that links 
pay to firm performance. In particular, it may be that equity-based compensation such as 
incentive stock option is important for quantifying this relation. Other studies also indicate that 
firm value is actually motivated by the form of compensation that managers hold. Firm 
performance is positively related to the percentage of manger’s compensation that is equity-
based. Mehran (1995) finds that both ROA and Tobin’s Q are positively related to equity-based 
compensation and to the percentage of equity held by managers. 
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In contrast of finding of a positive relation between firm performance and executive 
compensation, there have been some papers that show the opposite results.  Core, Holthausen 
and Larcker (1999) find that a 40% increase in excess compensation is related to a decline in 
annual returns from stock per year  of -4.97%, -2.82%, and -1.78% for 1 year, 3 year and 5 year 
stock return. Excess compensation is significantly related to subsequent firm performance in 
stock and operating return. Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) get similar results by using excess 
holding period returns as the firm performance measure. They find the greater compensation 
received by director and CEO is associated with greater agency problems, which may lead to 
underperformance. 
Other researches find either a low or no relation between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. Top managers are not motivated by compensation plan to increase firm value and 
shareholder wealth as many investigators indicate. Marris (1963) and Baumol (1967) argue that 
it is the firm size or growth rate rather than the performance that managers are concerned 
about. Managers’ compensation may tied pay to firm size and they may get higher prestige from 
managing a larger firm. Loomis (1982) finds that there is no relation between top manager’s 
compensation and firm profitability or stock return performance. Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) 
examine the CEO compensation in China’s listed firms. They use return on sales and annual 
stock return to measure firm performance, both measures are positively related to CEO 
compensation but neither is significant. They also find a positive and significant relation between 
firm size and CEO compensation. Brian (1994) finds that neither firm scale nor profitability is 
significantly related to CEO compensation. 
More related to our question of research is looking at how compensation was affected by the 
financial crises. Gilson (1989) uses a sample of financially distressed firms that suffered huge 
decreases in stock price during the year 1979 to 1984, and finds that declines in senior 
managers’ pay due to financial distress are associated with management turnover. During the 
research period, 52% of sampled firms changed their senior management, while the 
management turnover rate is only 19% when firms are not distressed. Stuart and Michael 
(1993) investigate senior managers’ compensation in firms that experienced bankruptcy or 
private debt renegotiation during 1981-1987. Nearly one third of CEOs replaced and the new 
CEOs are paid 35% less than the CEOs they replace, while remaining CEOs experience large 
reduction in cash compensation. Overall, there is a significant relation between CEO 
compensation and shareholder wealth after debt renegotiation in firms. Abdullah (2006) uses a 
sample of 86 distressed firms and 86 non-distressed firms for the year 2001 in Malaysia 
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(negative EPS for distressed firms during analysis period) to study directors’ pay in financially 
distressed firms. Abdullah finds that distressed firms pay directors less compared with non-
distressed firms due to a significant and negative relation between directors’ compensation and 
distressed situations. He also provides evidence that directors’ pay is positively related to firm 
size and growth rate. Renée (2012) argues that reduction in CEO compensation is seen as a 
sign of better governance. Tung and Wang (2011) focus on the bank industry during the global 
Financial Crisis and the association between CEOs’ inside debt compensation and bank 
performance. They find CEOs’ inside debt holding before the Crisis are positively related to 
bank performance and negatively related to risk taking during the Crisis. On average, preceding 
the Crisis, banks that performed better in the Crisis preferred less risk and pay more the CEO 
more in salary and bonus, and less in equity-based compensation. In contrast, Kirkpatrick 
(2009) provides evidence that CEO compensation has not closely followed firm performance. 
He finds S&P 500 companies’ median CEO compensation was approximately USD 8.4 million in 
2007 and was unaffected by the weak economy that followed. 
3. Source of data and methodology 
3.1 Data source and time 
We collected our data for annual CEO compensation in the Execucomp database on the 
COMPUSTAT Quarterly Updates File. We selected data items for the years 2006 to 2012: (1) 
ticker, (2) company ID number (GVKEY), (3) industry group (SIC code), (4) bonus, (5) options 
granted (Black-Scholes value), (6) restricted stock grant, (7) salary, (8) TDC1 -- total 
compensation. Our data for firm financial information comes from COMPUSTAT North America 
Annual Fundamentals File for the same periods: (9) total assets, (10) stockholders’ equity -- 
total, (11) discontinued operations, (12) income before extraordinary items, (13) sales (net). Our 
data for firm performance is in the CRSP database on the Stock / Security monthly Files for the 
years 2006 to 2008 before the Financial Crisis: (14) holding period return. Our final sample 
consists of 174 good firms and 117 bad firms; the remaining 836 firms for which we collect from 
Execucomp database are neither of the two groups. 
CEO Compensation: We use sampled firms’ CEO compensation as our dependent variable 
in a regression model. CEO compensation is the variable TDC1 in Execucomp database. It is 
the total compensation that comprises salary, bonus, restricted stock granted, stock options 
granted (using Black-Scholes), and other pay. We also analyze separately equity-based 
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compensation and none equity-based compensation. Equity-base compensation is defined as 
the total value of restricted stock (Execucomp variable RSTKGRNT) and stock option 
(Execucomp variable OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE). We find the data for equity-based 
compensation is incomplete in the Execucomp database. So instead of using restricted stock 
plus stock options to get equity-based compensation, we first get none equity-based 
compensation, which is salary plus bonus, then calculate equity-based compensation as  total 
compensation minus none equity-based compensation. All of the three compensations are 
transformed to their natural log in our multi-regression model. 
Control Variables: In our quantitative analysis, we use several control variables. Two 
measures are used to control firm performance, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). To remove trends in volatility and make sure data are positive, ROA is the natural log of 
one plus income before extraordinary items deducted by discontinued operations divided by 
book value of total assets. ROE is defined similarly to ROA; with the exception that book value 
of total assets is replaced with shareholders’ total equity. Other variable used are firm size, as 
measured by net sales, which is defined as gross sales minus cash discounts, trade discounts, 
and allowances and returned sales for which credit is given to customers in COMPUSTAT. 
Finally, we control for unobserved firm and industry level changes that are associated with CEO 
compensation in different firms, industries and years by interacting firm and industry dummy 
with year dummy. The industry classification is based on two-digit SIC code. 
 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
Firm performance Independence: We use HPR (holding period return) as our firm 
performance measure. HPR is defined as a return (including dividends) for the month. We use 
monthly HPR to compute the annual HPR by calculating the buy and hold return over a calendar 
year. We then compute the industry HPR as the median (equal weighted) of annual return 
sampled firms of the same two-digit SIC industry group. The firm adjusted return is the firm 
annual HPR minus the HPR in the industry. Our analysis for HPR spans the years 2006 to 
2008. If a firm’s HPR is larger than its industry HPR during each of the years between 2006 and 
2008, the firm is defined as having good performance prior to the Financial Crisis. If the firm’s 
HPR is less than its industry HPR during each of the years 2006 to 2008, it is considered a firm 
that has bad performance prior to the Crisis. We exclude from the analysis firms whose HPR is 
larger than the industry HPR in at least one year (i.e., in either 2006, 2007, or 2008) and whose 
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HPR is smaller than the industry HPR in at least one year. Finally, we define a dummy variable 
that equals one if firm have a bad performance and zero if the firm has a good performance 
during the years 2006 to 2008.  
Table I, Panel A, shows the trend in compensation for good and bad performing firms 
between 2006 and 2012, the HPR performance of good and bad firms is partitioned based on 
two-digit SIC code. We put the raw data of two graphs in Appendix 1. 
The first graph shows that both good performing firms and bad performing firms decreased 
their CEOs’ total compensation after the Crisis (for the years 2008 to 2009). The bad performing 
firms decreased from $6.278 million to $3.825 million between 2007 and 2009, dropped almost 
$2.5 million. The good performing firms decreased from $7.333 million in 2008 to $6.235 million 
in 2009, dropped about $1.1 million, which is much less than the firm that performed badly. 
Moreover, the total compensation in good performing firms is higher than that of the bad 
performing firms in all years from 2006 to 2012. The equity portion of compensation in two 
groups show a similar pattern, suggesting that the level and trend in total compensation are 
determined to a large extend by the equity-based compensation. 
The second graph shows that the salary for good performing firms increased steadily from 
2006 to 2012, while salary for bad performing firms increased in 2010 then decreased in 
2011and 2012. Bonus for good performing firms decreased before 2010 and then steadily 
increased, while Bonus for bad performing firms has big fluctuation before and after the Crisis. 
The results perhaps indicate the relation between compensation incentive and firm 
performance; bad performing firms get less compensation compared with good performing 
firms. The drop in the compensation after the Crisis seems to be related with resetting of 
incentive compensation by the firms’ boards, which appear to be effective.  
To ensure that the total compensation is set based on performance, we use t-test to check 
whether the difference of average total compensation is significant between good and bad 
performing firms after the Crisis. Table I, panel B shows that the difference of average total 
compensation between good and bad performing firms is statistically significant at the 1% level 
for the years 2008 to 2009 while insignificant in other years. In 2008, CEO compensation in 
good performing firms shows a slight increase compared with the total compensation in 2007. 
While CEO compensation in bad performing firms revealed a huge drop from $6.278 million to 
$4.538 million in the corresponding period. It drags the difference of compensation from $0.901  
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
The table shows compensation and financial characteristics of North America public firms between 2006 and 2012. 
The data of 1127 sampled firms that have executive compensation information and financial information comes 
from the COMPUSTAT, the Execucomp and the CRSP databases. In Panel A, a good performing firm is defined as 
a firm whose HPR (holding period return) is larger than its industry HPR during for each of the years between 2006 
and 2008, and a bad performing firm is defined as a firm whose HPR is less than its industry HPR during each of the 
years 2006 to 2008. HPR is defined as a return (including dividends) for the change in an investment’s total value in 
a common stock over monthly period of time per dollar of initial investment in CRSP database. The firm annual 
HPR is the buy and hold return over a calendar year. The industry HPR is the median (equal weighted) of annual 
return sampled firms of the same two-digit SIC industry group. In Panel B, t-value is compared to 1.96 at level 5% 
significant level. N is the number of observations, and df is the degree of freedom. In Panels C and D, numbers 
without parentheses are averages, and numbers within parentheses are medians. In Panel A, B and C, total 
compensation is the variable TDC1 in Execucomp that comprises salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), and other pay. None equity-based compensation 
consists of salary and bonus. The equity-based compensation is total compensation (TDC1) minus none equity-
based compensation. In Panel D, sales is defined as gross sales minus cash discounts, trade discounts, and 
allowances and returned sales for which credit is given to customers in COMPUSTAT. ROA is the natural log of 
one plus income before extraordinary items deducted by discontinued operations divided by book value of total 
assets, and ROE is the natural log of one plus income before extraordinary items deducted by discontinued 
operations divided by shareholders’ total equity. 
Panel A: CEO Average Compensation of Good/Bad Firm ($thousands) 
 
 
(continued) 
20004000
60008000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total compensation(bad firm) Total compensation(good firm)Equity-based(bad firm) Equity-based(good firm)
200400
600800
10001200
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Salary(bad firm) Salary(good firm)Bonus(bad firm) Bonus(good firm)
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Table I-Continued 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: CEO Compensation ($thousands) 
Year Total Salary Bonus Equity Non-equity 
 
Compensation 
    2006 5188.57 671.30 560.00 4572.92 615.65 
 
(3144.00) (603.08) (0) (758.14) (2099.28) 
2007 5418.25 733.10 406.57 4848.42 569.84 
 
(2944.94) (639.22) (0) (715.79) (2028.66) 
2008 5014.14 733.10 298.02 4498.58 515.56 
 
(2684.57) (697.85) (0) (758.14) (1885.79) 
2009 4487.64 771.68 225.86 3988.87 498.77 
 
(2937.37) (700.33) (0) (785.00) (2036.56) 
2010 5889.33 832.53 274.33 5335.90 553.43 
 
(3756.50) (750.00) (0) (825.03) (2833.61) 
2011 6166.03 869.88 247.80 5607.19 558.84 
 
(4299.21) (823.46) (0) (872.99) (3367.94) 
2012 6566.51 896.45 285.60 5975.49 591.02 
 
(4763.20) (857.90) (0) (927.50) (3812.16) 
                                                                                                                                     (continued) 
Panel B: Total compensation t-test results 
    Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. N t-value df 
2006 Good 6159.47 6070.33 568.54 114 1.29 211 
Bad 5055.20 7914.10 639.78 99 
 Diff 1104.27  853.02    
2007 
Good 7179.14 8540.35 692.71 152 0.80 268 Bad 6278.11 9848.45 906.62 118 
 Diff 901.03  1120.74    
2008 
Good 7332.82 10700.09 867.89 152 2.13 271 Bad 4537.55 10869.08 988.10 121 
 Diff 2795.26  1312.79    
2009 Good 6235.06 7888.41 623.63 160 2.86 270 Bad 3825.16 4961.34 468.80 112 
 Diff 2409.90  842.50    
2010 Good 7112.76 8413.65 647.20 169 1.55 275 Bad 5628.38 6630.06 637.98 108 
 Diff 1484.38  957.02    
2011 Good 7923.76 6761.75 736.51 177 1.51 295 
Bad 6326.54 6775.07 689.59 120 
 Diff 1597.22 
 
1059.65    
2012 Good 7711.30 10700.09 512.61 174 1.68 289 
Bad 6354.05 10869.08 626.36 117 
  Diff 1357.25   809.06       
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Table I-Continued 
 
Panel D: Financial Characteristics 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sales 9173.77 9120.64 9691.51 8976.82 9220.55 10348.44 9949.99 
 
(2205.32) (2157.23) (2229.90) (2054.31) (2217.83) (2505.00) (2525.83) 
ROE (%) 5.2 4.3 1.5 3.1 4.5 4.5 4.3 
 
(4.0) (3.6) (2.4) (2.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.1) 
ROA (%) 12.5 11.7 9.10 8.40 9.60 10.1 9.9 
  (13.0) (11.5) (4.2) (6.8) (10.8) (11.0) (11.6) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 Sales ($thousands) 
million to $2.795 million. The t-test results suggest that bad performing firms drop their CEO 
compensation more than good performing firms after the Crisis. For the post crisis period from 
2010 to 2012, CEO compensation in good and bad performing firms recovers slowly from the 
shock of the Crisis. The differences between two groups shrink from $2.410 million to $1.357 
million.  
In summary, by comparing the average CEO compensation in two groups, we find that the 
Crisis had an impact on CEO compensation, and firms that had bad performance prior to the 
Crisis had a significant drop in their compensation after the Crisis, compared to good performing 
firms. Moreover, the differences between the two groups narrowed. We believe the possible 
reasons are that the influence of the Financial Crisis has become less as time passed by; the 
criteria we use to distinguish good and bad performing firms is their HPR from 2006 to 2008, 
and this prior crisis measure may not still hold after the Crisis. 
Results in Panel C of Table I present descriptive statistics of sampled firms’ CEO 
compensation. Average total compensation increased from $5.189 million to $5.418 million 
between 2006 and 2007, then decreased to $4.488 million in 2009, and again increased to 
$6.567 million in 2012, most of which is explained by the similar trend in equity compensation, 
which took nearly 90% of the total compensation. Interestingly, the median compensation 
decreased from $3.144 million to $2.945 million from 2006 to 2007. The opposite trend between 
average and median compensation suggests that the increase in compensation is due to the 
increase in the amount paid to the highly compensated CEOs before the Crisis. The average 
salary increased steadily from $0.671 million in 2006 to $0.896 million in 2012, but the bonus 
declined from $0.56 million to $0.286 million between 2006 and 2012 and median bonus was 
zero during the whole period because more than a half of the firms didn’t pay bonus to their 14  
CEO. The average none equity-based compensation did not change much from the year 2006 
to 2012, mainly because of the offset of changes in salary and bonus.  
Results in Panel D of Table I are descriptive statistics of sampled firms’ financial variables. 
Average sales increased from $9.174 million in 2006 to $9.950 million in 2012. Median sales are 
much lower ($2.27 million on average). This result suggests that some very large firms skew our 
sample. ROE decreased between 2006 and 2008, and then increased from 2009 to 2011. ROA 
shows a similar trend. Both of them are consist with the economic trend between the year 2006 
and 2011. 
3.3 Methodology 
Based on most prior studies, one expects to find a relation between compensation incentives 
and firm performance. We hypothesize that if the Global Financial Crisis affects CEO 
compensation, then firms that did not performed well before the Crisis should pay to their CEOs 
less than firms that did well preceding the Crisis. Our measure of firm performance prior to the 
Crisis is whether the firm’s annual HPR (holding period return) was above the corresponding 
industry’s average annual HPR consecutively from the year 2006 to 2008 before the Financial 
Crisis. A multi-regression analysis of 291 firms during 2006 to 2012 is set up to test our 
hypothesis. That is, 
Ln(Total compensation)= α + β1*Dummy(good/bad firm performance before ’09)i  
*dummy (’09-’12)t + β2* ROA*dummy(’06-’08)t + β3* ROA *dummy(’09-’12)t 
+ β4* ROE *dummy(’06-’08)t + β5* ROE *dummy(’09-’12)t 
+ β6* Sales*dummy(’06-’08)t + β7* Sales*dummy(’09-’12)t  
+ Industry_Effects + Year_Effects + Firm_Effects + εit.   
ε: error term; i: state of firm; t: time. 
                                                           Table II 
                                    Variable definitions and descriptions 
Variable name Variable description and comments 
Total 
compensation 
The sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total value 
of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), and other compensation. 
ROA The natural log of one plus income before extraordinary items deducted by 
discontinued operations divided by book value of total assets. 
 
 
 
 
   (continued) 
 
 15  
 
 
ROE 
Table II-Continued 
 
The natural log of one plus income before extraordinary items deducted by 
discontinued operations divided by shareholders’ total equity. 
Firm_Effects A firm dummy variable that is used to control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneities that are correlated with compensation. 
Industry_Effects An industry dummy variable that is used to control for unobserved industry 
heterogeneities that are correlated with compensation. 
Year_Effects A year dummy variable that is used to control for unobserved year 
heterogeneities that are correlated with compensation. 
Dummy 
(good/bad firm 
performance 
before ’09) 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm had a good performance before 
2009 and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy(’06-’08) A dummy variable that equals 1 if observation is in the period 2006 to 2008 
and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy(’09-’12) A dummy variable that equals 1 if observation is in the period 2009 to 2012 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
This regression model follows the method carried out by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) 
and is commonly used for analyzing the difference in differences approach. We have two 
groups – good performing firms and bad performing firms, and we expect to find that bad 
performing firms reacted more vigorously to the shock by reducing the compensation to a larger 
degree compared to good performing firms. This should be the case, if there are not substantial 
differences between good and bad firms in terms of performance (captured by the control 
variables), and governance (which we do not control for). 
 β1 in the above model catches the CEO compensation changes of firms that had bad 
performance prior to Crisis in the post-crisis period (year 2009 to 2012) compared with firms that 
performed well before the Crisis. In order to make sure that the changes in compensation for all 
firms are mainly caused by the exogenous shock of the Financial Crisis, two performance 
control variables and one size control variable are included in the model and summarized in 
table II. All of the controls are multiplied by dummy variables for whether the year belongs to the 
period preceding the Crisis or after the Crisis. We also include industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects to control for unobserved industry, year and firm heterogeneities 
that are correlated with compensation.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Total Compensation and Firm performance 
    Table III shows the results of regressions for the sample of 291 firms between 2006 and 2012 
(a total of 2037 firm-years), after adding the control variables, the sample is reduced to 1438 
observations. In the first column we show the results that include no fixed effects in the 
regression, in the second column we show the results that include only year fixed effect, and in 
the last column we show the results that include both year and industry fixed effects in our 
regression. We put the regression results with raw data in Appendix 2. 
All the columns show that the coefficients on the interaction dummy of firms that had a bad 
performance before the Crisis are negative and significant at the 10% level, with magnitudes of 
−0.357, -0.374 and -0.255, respectively. The magnitudes of the coefficient separately suggest a 
37.8% drop, a 39.6% drop and a 27.0% drop in the total compensation of firms that did not 
perform well before the Crisis, compared to good performing firms.  
We find that the sensitivity of total compensation to the interaction dummy of firms that 
performed bad before the Crisis increased when we considered year fixed effect in the 
regression, but then decreased when we added industry fixed effect. It suggests that the 
difference of compensation between good and bad performing firms may have little relation with 
unobservable year specific characteristics, but could be partially caused by some specific 
industry events that cannot be observed.  
    We also find that firm size has a positive and very significant effect (at the 1% level) on 
compensation, this coincide with what most of the prior empirical paper proved. In our 
regression, ROA has less effect on compensation during the whole analysis period. However, 
the sensitivity of compensation to ROA becomes significant when we include year and industry 
fixed effects in our regression, and the magnitudes of the coefficient also become larger 
compared with column 1 and 2. 
4.2. The Components of Compensation and firm performance 
The results showed in the previous part suggest that firms that had bad performance prior to 
the Crisis decreased their CEO compensation after the Crisis, compared to those who 
performed well before the Crisis. We now explore which parts of the compensation are 
responsible for the drop. 
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Table III 
Total Compensation and Firm Performance 
The table shows the results of three panel regressions, where the dependent variable is the natural log of total CEO 
compensation (variable TDC1 in Execucomp). The sample consists of 291 firms that exist in Execucomp between 
2006 and 2012. ROA is the natural log of one plus income before extraordinary items deducted by discontinued 
operations divided by book value of total assets. ROE is the natural log of one plus income before extraordinary 
items deducted by discontinued operations divided by shareholders’ total equity. Sales is defined as gross sales 
minus cash discounts, trade discounts, and allowances and returned sales for which credit is given to customers in 
COMPUSTAT. Dummy (good/bad firm performance before ’08) is dummy variable that equals one if the firm had a 
good performance before the Financial Crisis and zero otherwise. A good performing firm is defined as a firm 
whose HPR (holding period return) is larger than its industry HPR during for each of the years between 2006 and 
2008, and a bad performing firm is defined as a firm whose HPR is less than its industry HPR during each of the 
years 2006 to 2008. HPR is defined as a return (including dividends) for the change in an investment’s total value in 
a common stock over monthly period of time per dollar of initial investment in CRSP database. The firm annual 
HPR is the buy and hold return over a calendar year. The industry HPR is the median (equal weighted) of annual 
return sampled firms of the same two-digit SIC industry group. Dummy (’06–’08) is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the observation is in the period 2006 to 2008 and zero otherwise. Dummy (’09–’12) is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the observation is in the period 2009 to 2012 and zero otherwise. Industry and year fixed effects are 
dummy variables that are used to control for unobserved industry and year heterogeneities that are correlated with 
compensation. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. + indicates we include that fixed effect in the 
regression. N is the number of observations. *, **, and***indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable (1)   (2)   (3) 
Ln (Total Compensation)           
Dummy(Good/Bad firm -0.357* 
 
-0.374* 
 
-0.255* 
performance before'09 (0.194) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(0.135) 
*dummy('09-'12) 
     ROA*dummy('06-'08) 0.051 
 
0.024 
 
0.077 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.119) 
ROA*dummy('09-'12) 0.060 
 
0.035 
 
0.102 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.086) 
ROE*dummy('06-'08) 0.755 
 
0.871 
 
1.062* 
 
(0.781) 
 
(0.811) 
 
(0.626) 
ROE*dummy('09-'12) 0.985* 
 
0.781 
 
1.029* 
 
(0.579) 
 
(0.583) 
 
(0.604) 
Size*dummy('06-'08) 0.418*** 
 
0.440*** 
 
0.467*** 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.034) 
Size*dummy('09-'12) 0.452*** 
 
0.437*** 
 
0.463*** 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
Intercept 4.802 
 
4.932 
 
5.810 
 
(0.286) 
 
(0.316) 
 
(0.367) 
Adjusted R-squared 27.7% 
 
28.2% 
 
41.5% 
Year Fixed Effect 
  
+ 
 
+ 
Industry Fixed Effect 
    
+ 
N 1438 
 
1438 
 
1438 18  
Table IV 
Equity and Non-equity Compensation and Firm Performance 
The table shows the results of six panel regressions with two dependent variables. The dependent variables are: the 
natural log of equity-based compensation and the natural log of none equity-based compensation. None equity-based 
compensation consists of salary (Execucomp variable SALARY) and bonus (Execucomp variable BONUS). The 
equity-based compensation is total compensation (Execucomp variable TDC1) minus none equity-based 
compensation. The sample consists of 289 firms that exist in Execucomp between 2006 and 2012. The definition of 
variables appears in Table III. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. + indicates we include that 
fixed effect in the regression. N is the number of observations.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable LnEquity LnNon LnEquity LnNon LnEquity LnNon 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Dummy(Good/Bad firm -0.194 -0.055 
 
-0.233* -0.071 
 
-0.166 0.176 
performance before'09 (0.125) (0.213) 
 
(0.125) (0.21) 
 
(0.142) (0.191) 
*dummy('09-'12) 
        ROA*dummy('06-'08) 0.194 0.168 
 
0.162 0.110 
 
0.161 0.054 
 
(0.226) (0.166) 
 
(0.225) (0.157) 
 
(0.203) (0.169) 
ROA*dummy('09-'12) 0.016 0.303 
 
-0.013 0.312 
 
0.045 0.352 
 
(0.115) (0.221) 
 
(0.116) (0.234) 
 
(0.119) (0.243) 
ROE*dummy('06-'08) -1.279 -0.318 
 
-0.901 -0.120 
 
-0.611 0.566 
 
(1.828) (0.812) 
 
(1.687) (0.821) 
 
(1.472) (0.803) 
ROE*dummy('09-'12) -0.084 0.664 
 
-0.495 0.550 
 
-0.662 1.198 
 
(0.927) (0.852) 
 
(0.953) (0.854) 
 
(1.001) (0.865) 
Size*dummy('06-'08) 0.584*** 0.139*** 
 
0.644*** 0.183*** 
 
0.675*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.043) (0.048) 
 
(0.064) (0.043) 
 
(0.065) (0.042) 
Size*dummy('09-'12) 0.627*** 0.135** 
 
0.588*** 0.107 
 
0.627*** 0.077 
 
(0.041) (0.055) 
 
(0.036) (0.069) 
 
(0.039) (0.084) 
Intercept 3.029*** 5.650 
 
3.412*** 5.316 
 
4.399*** 5.923 
 
(0.354) (0.330) 
 
(0.332) (0.242) 
 
(0.362) (0.546) 
Adjusted R-squared 29.8% 3.45% 
 
30.8% 3.7% 
 
42.9% 17.54% 
Year Fixed Effect 
   
+ + 
 
+ + 
Industry Fixed Effect 
      
+ + 
N 1410 1429   1410 1429   1410 1429 
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Table V 
Total Compensation and Equity and Firm Performance include firm fixed effect 
The table shows the results of four panel regressions with four dependent variables. The dependent variables are: 
total compensation and the natural log of total compensation, equity-based compensation and the natural log of 
equity-based compensation. The sample consists of 291 firms that exist in Execucomp between 2006 and 2012. The 
definition of variables appears in Table III. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. + indicates we 
include that fixed effect in the regression. N is the number of observations.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variables Total   Lntotal   Equity   Lnequity 
  Compensation Compensation       
Dummy(Good/Bad firm 
       performance before'09 -248.70 
 
0.037 
 
-80.927 
 
0.071 
*dummy('09-'12) (587) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(481.126) 
 
(0.146) 
ROA*dummy('06-'08) 511 
 
-0.057 
 
-388.913 
 
0.078 
 
(1131) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(926.400) 
 
(0.279) 
ROA*dummy('09-'12) -0.667 
 
-0.023 
 
-250.582 
 
-0.075 
 
(819) 
 
(0.113) 
 
-671.058 
 
(0.201) 
ROE*dummy('06-'08) 5226 
 
0.478 
 
8028** 
 
0.354 
 
(4705) 
 
(0.647) 
 
(3854) 
 
(1.162) 
ROE*dummy('09-'12) 8243* 
 
0.522 
 
7641** 
 
1.030 
 
(4541) 
 
(0.625) 
 
(3721) 
 
(1.119) 
Size*dummy('06-'08) 1577** 
 
0.346*** 
 
1224** 
 
0.288* 
 
(633) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(518.346) 
 
(0.157) 
Size*dummy('09-'12) 1707*** 
 
0.332*** 
 
1444*** 
 
0.239 
 
(640) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(524.241) 
 
(0.158) 
Intercept -6173 
 
5.773*** 
 
-5585 
 
6.252*** 
 
(5079) 
 
(0.699) 
 
(4161) 
 
(1.258) 
Adjusted R-squared 4.9% 
 
8.4% 
 
6.3% 
 
7.8% 
Year Fixed Effect + 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Firm Fixed Effect + 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
N 1438 
 
1438 
 
1438 
 
1410 
Number of Groups 291 
 
291 
 
291 
 
291 
 
 
    To test which components may have effects on total compensation, we do the analysis in the 
previous part again, but this time we replace the total compensation with the equity-based 
portion and none equity-based portion of compensation as our dependent variables. 
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Table IV shows the results of six panel regressions. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent 
variables are the natural log of the equity-based compensation and the natural log of none 
equity-based compensation on the situation of no fixed effects included. In column 3 and 4, we 
include only year fixed effect for two dependent variables. In column 5 and 6, both year and 
industry fixed effects are considered for two dependent variables. We put the regression results 
with raw data in appendix 3. 
 
The coefficient on the equity-based portion is negative, but it is statistically significant from 
zero and of larger magnitude only when we include only year fixed effect. The magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that the reduction of equity-based compensation is about 22.4%. 
 
The coefficients on none equity-base portion are not statistically significant from zero in all 
panels. Interesting, the coefficient changes from negative to positive after we include year and 
industry fixed effects in the regression, suggesting that the bad performing firms increased their 
none equity-based compensation about 16.4% after the Crisis, compared to good performing 
firms. This result may be caused by unobservable specific industry characteristics that exist 
during our analysis period. 
 
     Table V shows the results of the regression that include year and firm fixed effects. We find 
that all the coefficients on the interaction dummy of firms that had a bad performance before the 
Crisis are not significant. This result may suggest that the reduction in equity compensation may 
be associated with unobservable firm characteristics and not with the crises per se. However, it 
is important to note that using firm fixed-effect reduces the power of the tests and it is not 
common to control for firm fixed-effect in such short panels.  Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) 
run their regression with firm fixed effects to capture the tenure effect for most sampled firms.  
 
     The insignificant coefficient β1 could be also because of the difference between good and 
bad performing firms diminished during the Crisis. That is, the difference in differences 
approach is contaminated because the untreated sample (the good performing firms) actually 
was exposed to the Crisis. This works against us finding a significant coefficient in the 
regression. 
 
21  
Overall, the results suggest that firms performed badly before the Crisis decreased both the 
equity-based portion and non-equity-based portion of compensation after the Crisis. The 
reduction in compensation seems to be derived from the drop in equity-based compensation. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper studies the relation between firm performance prior to the Financial Crisis and 
their CEO compensation after the Crisis. Firstly, we compare the compensation characteristics 
between good and bad performing firms and do a simple t-test for them. We find that the Global 
Financial Crisis had an effect on CEO compensation, and firms that performed badly before the 
Crisis had a significant decrease in their compensation after the Crisis compared with good 
performing firms. Then we set up a multi-regression model to test our hypothesis. 
 
By using the difference in differences method to control for the economic shock of the 
Financial Crisis and including year and industry fixed effects in our regression, we find a large 
decrease in CEO compensation for firms that had bad performance before the Crisis, compared 
to those who performed well prior to the Crisis. The reduction of the CEO compensation was 
1.19 million US dollars for bad performing firms, suggesting a drop of 27.0% after the Crisis. We 
also find that the reduction in compensation seems to be derived from the drop in equity portion 
of the compensation. 
 
Together, our findings suggest that firms’ boards are effective and considered the firm 
performance prior to the Crisis when they decided the compensation plan following the 
economic shock of the Crisis. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of CEO compensation of good/bad firms 
 
CEO Compensation of Good/Bad Company  
Bad Company 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total  5055.20 6278.11 4537.55 3825.16 5628.38 6326.54 6354.05 
Compensation (2908.58) (2522.08) (2409.65) (2460.10) (3292.86) (4516.79) (4334.77) 
Salary 738.86 711.32 719.94 754.12 1006.82 906.77 890.79 
(600) (629.09) (700) (703.35) (760.63) (823.27) (868.23) 
Bonus 778.34 570.47 962.92 407.58 499.29 431.06 548.05 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Equity 3510.82 4989.08 2841.28 2663.45 4108.46 4988.71 4915.21 
(674.60) (673.08) (712.69) (718.02) (809.01) (874.81) (900.00) 
 
Good Company 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total 6159.47 7179.14 7332.82 6235.06 7112.76 7923.76 7711.30 
Compensation (3995.41) (4003.34) (3929.12) (3693.43) (4116.16) (5077.07) (5848.19) 
Salary 779.35 774.92 802.38 877.16 881.16 927.49 952.45 
(687.50) (655.00) (682.50) (696.00) (728.00) (825.00) (850.00) 
Bonus 608.04 564.96 387.77 362.39 382.59 455.68 500.75 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Equity 4751.33 5839.26 6138.43 4991.33 5849.01 6540.59 6258.10 
(3227.13) (3177.69) (2945.98) (2861.01) (2955.49) (4010.62) (4277.45) 
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Appendix 2: Regression results with raw data 
 
Dependent Variable (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Total Compensation 
     Dummy(Good/Bad firm -1645.719** 
 
-1685.29** 
 
-1191.629 
performance before'09 (805.652) 
 
(799.967) 
 
(1067.776) 
*dummy('09-'12) 
     ROA*dummy('06-'08) 623.387 
 
715.084 
 
703.9795* 
 
(1327.196) 
 
(1366.286) 
 
(1496.954) 
ROA*dummy('09-'12) 1069.264** 
 
968.569* 
 
976.6701* 
 
(512.854) 
 
(504.945) 
 
(557.291) 
ROE*dummy('06-'08) 4530.788 
 
4835.659 
 
8463.703 
 
(5821.103) 
 
(5934.353) 
 
(5949.997) 
ROE*dummy('09-'12) 4793.533 
 
4129.006 
 
7574.095** 
 
(3341.975) 
 
(3541.159) 
 
(3212.221) 
Size*dummy('06-'08) 2676.958*** 
 
2685.629*** 
 
2914.937*** 
 
(294.0189) 
 
(353.6122) 
 
(387.105) 
Size*dummy('09-'12) 2779.186*** 
 
2767.194*** 
 
3010.86*** 
 
(294.019) 
 
(297.860) 
 
-409.180 
Intercept -14559.450 
 
-14398.350 
 
-10585.26 
Adjusted R-squared 27.99% 
 
29.47% 
 
28.31% 
Year Fixed Effect 
  
+ 
 
+ 
Industry Fixed Effect 
    
+ 
N 1438 
 
1438 
 
1438 
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Appendix 3: Comparison of regression results of equity& nonequity 
 
Dependent Variable Equity Non-equity Equity Non-equity Equity 
Non- 
equity 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dummy(Good/Bad firm -0.194 -0.055 
 
-0.233* -0.071 
 
-0.166 0.176 
performance before'09 (0.125) (0.213) 
 
(0.125) (0.21) 
 
(0.142) (0.191) 
*dummy('09-'12) 
        ROA*dummy('06-'08) 0.194 0.168 
 
0.162 0.110 
 
0.161 0.054 
 
(0.226) (0.166) 
 
(0.225) (0.157) 
 
(0.203) (0.169) 
ROA*dummy('09-'12) 0.016 0.303 
 
-0.013 0.312 
 
0.045 0.352 
 
(0.115) (0.221) 
 
(0.116) (0.234) 
 
(0.119) (0.243) 
ROE*dummy('06-'08) -1.279 -0.318 
 
-0.901 -0.120 
 
-0.611 0.566 
 
(1.828) (0.812) 
 
(1.687) (0.821) 
 
(1.472) (0.803) 
ROE*dummy('09-'12) -0.084 0.664 
 
-0.495 0.550 
 
-0.662 1.198 
 
(0.927) (0.852) 
 
(0.953) (0.854) 
 
(1.001) (0.865) 
Size*dummy('06-'08) 0.584*** 0.139*** 
 
0.644*** 0.183*** 
 
0.675**
* 0.162*** 
 
(0.043) (0.048) 
 
(0.064) (0.043) 
 
(0.0645) (0.042) 
Size*dummy('09-'12) 0.627*** 0.135** 
 
0.588*** 0.107 
 
0.627**
* 0.077 
 
(0.041) (0.055) 
 
(0.036) (0.069) 
 
(0.0392) (0.084) 
Intercept 3.029*** 5.650 
 
3.412*** 5.316 
 
4.399**
* 5.923 
 
(0.354) (0.330) 
 
(0.332) (0.242) 
 
(0.362) (0.546) 
Adjusted R-squared 29.8% 3.45% 
 
30.8% 3.7% 
 
42.9% 17.54% 
Year Fixed Effect 
   
+ + 
 
+ + 
Industry Fixed Effect 
      
+ + 
N 1410 1429 
 
1410 1429 
 
1410 1429 
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